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Granne: Two-Dimensional Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption

TWO-DIMENSIONAL FEDERALISM AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS PREEMPTION
Michael Aaron Granne*
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal government has several explicit grants of foreign affairs
powers in the Constitution.1 States enjoy all powers not delegated to the
federal government by the United States Constitution. As the states
continue to intertwine themselves in the web of globalization, they seek
to act in ever-larger marketplaces. The web of commerce, the
environment, migration, and immigration are ready examples of areas of
the law and policy that do not respect state or national boundaries. In all
of these areas and countless others, however, state actions will butt up
against the federal government’s largely unfettered power to act in the
foreign affairs sphere. How and to what extent these state actions may
interfere with federal programs and interests in foreign affairs and
diplomacy, or to what extent those exercises of the federal foreign affairs
power preempt state actions, are questions that have vexed courts and
commentators alike.
Should, for example, a state be able to lengthen its statute of
limitations to remedy alleged wrongs done to a group of Mexican
migrant workers? Would it matter if their presence in the United States
was the result of and governed by agreements between the United States
federal government and Mexico?2 Can a state lengthen a statute of
limitations to provide a longer period in which to sue on life insurance
policies related to the Armenian Genocide?3 If there is some limitation
on the state government’s ability to change its own laws in such a
manner because of a federal interest, must the federal government
explicitly express that interest and/or its preemptive power? Or can that
prohibition be implied from other federal actions?
The courts have struggled to provide a coherent framework for
analyzing these questions. Scholars have quite correctly criticized the
∗

Visiting Assistant Professor, Hofstra Law School. I would like to thank Thomas
Healy, Kristen Boon, Edward Hartnett, Molly Land, Jacob Cogan, the Junior International
Law Scholars Association, and the participants in the International Law in the Domestic
Context Conference for valuable assistance with this essay.
1
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (regulating foreign commerce); U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 4 (providing for naturalization of aliens); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (punishing
violations of the law of nations); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–13 (declaring war and
providing for the army and navy); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (requiring the President serve as
commander-in-chief and signing and negotiating treaties).
2
See Cruz v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
3
See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 578 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2009).
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courts’ failures to provide rational doctrinal support even for those
incoherent frameworks that have been developed. Those critiques have
largely been of two types: (1) historical and originalist analyses, both
strict and lenient, on the use of federal foreign affairs prerogatives to
preempt otherwise valid state actions4 and (2) functionalist accounts of
the relative merits of the federal and state interests at issue.5
This essay follows yet another course. This essay argues that there
are principled distinctions to be made among state actions that encroach
on the federal government’s foreign affairs sphere. Following the recent
trend in scholarship to understand federalism in its so-called two
dimensions, this essay examines the extent to which federal interests in
uniformity, “vertical” federalism, and structural interests in coordination
among states, “horizontal” federalism, inform the proper understanding
and application of foreign affairs preemption. Analyzing foreign affairs
preemption cases through this lens results in a tripartite typology that,
this essay concludes, addresses and respects the federal and state
interests at stake. This typology provides some order to the chaos that
encompasses foreign affairs preemption cases.
Under this typology, a state’s action may fall into one of the
following three categories: (1) actions that implicate both the federal
government’s uniformity interest and the sister states’ coordination
interests and, therefore, lie outside the states’ constitutional power to
effect; (2) actions that interfere only with the federal government’s
uniform position in foreign affairs and, therefore, will be displaced if
they present an obstacle to a pre-existing federal policy; and (3) the
remaining default where neither uniformity nor coordination is a
concern and where only a specific conflict with a federal action will
preempt the state’s authority to act.
II. THE PARADIGMS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS PREEMPTION
The constitutional framework for foreign affairs preemption is
murky; the constitution has famously been called a “strange, laconic
document”6 regarding the distribution of the foreign affairs powers.
While there are notable dissenters, there is broad agreement that the
federal government possesses the lion’s share of the foreign affairs
powers. Congress is granted, for example, the powers to declare war,
regulate foreign commerce, punish offenses to the law of nations, and

See Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original
Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 403–29 (1999).
5
See Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175.
6
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 13 (2d ed. 1996).
4
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establish and support an Army and Navy. The Executive is the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and has the power to make
treaties and appoint ambassadors with the advice and consent of the
Senate. Some argue that the President has residual foreign affairs
powers under the Take Care and Vesting Clauses.7 Moreover, there are
explicit limitations on the role of the states in foreign affairs; their
inability to declare war, maintain armies, enter into treaties, compacts, or
agreements with foreign nations without congressional approval, and
the limitations on their powers to tax imports and exports. Taken
together with the history of the union under the Articles of
Confederation, the generally accepted conclusion is that the federal
government holds the majority (if not the totality) of the power to act in
the international arena.
There is broader dispute, however, about the extent to which the
existence of, or a federal action under, those powers displaces state law.
The Supreme Court has varying approaches to preemption. The Court
has been careless with its language and rhetoric, its constitutional and
policy justifications, and its overall analysis. Indeed, statements from
two of the most recent foreign affairs cases are almost completely
contradictory.8 Foreign affairs preemption is built on the idea that there
is a realm of foreign affairs that is simply outside the states’ competence.
What has never been made clear, though, is the extent to which federal
government action must divest the state of power by explicit action;
indeed, the Court expressly noted that the amount of federal action may
vary depending on the type of state action at issue.9

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . .”);
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.”). The Take Care and Vesting Clauses are more commonly used in
arguments supporting an expansive conception of Executive, as opposed to Legislative,
control over foreign affairs. Nevertheless, they are relevant to federalism questions
regarding the distribution of foreign affairs powers, not only those involving separation of
powers.
8
Compare Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1372 (2008) (“The Executive’s narrow and
strictly limited authority to settle international claims disputes pursuant to an executive
agreement cannot stretch so far as to support the current Presidential Memorandum.”),
with Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (“Although the source of the
President’s power to act in foreign affairs does not enjoy any textual detail, the historical
gloss on the ‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the
President’s ‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations.’”).
9
See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420 n.11.
7
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A. Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption
The broadest assertion of the federal foreign affairs power’s ability to
displace state law is Zschernig v. Miller.10 In Zschernig, the Court
invalidated an Oregon inheritance statute that required any real or
personal property willed to a non-resident alien to escheat to the state
unless the alien’s home country granted reciprocal rights of inheritance
for Oregon legatees. Despite previously upholding a facial challenge to a
similar statute in Clark v. Allen,11 the Court found various problems with
the statute in Zschernig, as applied by the courts of Oregon and other
states with similar statutes.12
The Court began Zschernig with the uncontroversial statement that
state courts are routinely called upon to interpret foreign law and that
such interpretation poses no constitutional problem. However, the
courts had been improperly using the reciprocity statute as a soapbox to
proclaim their cold war opinions.13 Indeed, various state courts had
conducted detailed investigations into foreign nations, including their
governmental structures, their administration of laws, the enforceability
of the rights of aliens generally, and whether these rights are “mere[]
dispensations turning upon the whim or caprice of government
officials.”14 Moreover, state courts rendered opinions regarding whether
government officials in those nations made credible representations of
the state of the law or whether those representations were made in bad
faith, and the courts engaged in other inquiries that would have “more
than ‘some incidental or indirect effect’” on the conduct of United States
foreign relations.15 Because of the courts’ application of the statute at
issue, the Court held that the Oregon statute was an unconstitutional
interference with the federal government’s foreign relations power, even
though that power had not been explicitly exercised and the U.S.
government had asserted that the reciprocity statutes did not unduly
interfere with its foreign relations activities.16
The Zschernig approach is often called dormant foreign affairs
preemption. Similar to preemption on the basis of the dormant
Commerce Clause, dormant foreign affairs preemption displaces state
law without regard to congressional (or executive) action or assertions of
state interference with federal prerogatives. State laws are preempted by
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
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389 U.S. 429 (1968).
331 U.S. 503 (1947).
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432–40.
Id. at 435.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 434–35.
Id. at 441.
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the radiations of authority from the various foreign affairs powers,
entrusted solely to the federal government, with which they do not
incidentally interfere.17
B. Obstacle Preemption
Another approach that the Court has occasionally followed when
faced with a foreign affairs challenge to a state statute is to ascertain
whether the statute in question presents an “obstacle to the
accomplishment of Congress’s full objectives.”18 The courts make this
determination by comparing the state action with policies, purposes, and
general structure of a pre-existing statute (and occasionally an Executive
Order or Agreement). If a sufficient obstacle is found, the state law must
fall. This doctrine is referred to as obstacle preemption.
The Court has applied obstacle preemption to foreign affairs
enactments several times.19 In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,20
for example, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts law barring state
entities from buying goods or services from companies doing business
with Burma. The Court did not reach the question of whether
Massachusetts had interfered with the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power.
Instead, the Court reasoned that the Massachusetts statute ran afoul of
previous congressional mandatory and conditional sanctions against
Burma.
The crucial point for the Court was that the state act “undermine[d]”
the detailed scheme that Congress had devised to sanction Burma and to
improve its human rights record.21 First, by enacting specific, automatic
sanctions against Burma, the Massachusetts law constrained the
discretion that Congress had delegated to the President.22 Second,
Congress had decided that a certain range of sanctions was appropriate
and Massachusetts’s approach fell outside that range.23
Finally,
Congress directed the President to reach out to the international
community to create a cohesive, multilateral approach in order to get
Burma to improve its human rights record. By limiting the President’s
ability to negotiate with Burma and the rest of the international
community, the Massachusetts act unduly interfered with congressional
See Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 204–05.
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000).
19
See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 60–66 (1941).
20
Crosby, 530 U.S. at 366.
21
Id. at 373.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 377–79.
17
18
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intent.24 It was an “obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress,” therefore conflicting with the
congressional mandate and running afoul of the Supremacy Clause.25
More controversially, in American Insurance Association v. Garamendi,
the Supreme Court invalidated the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act
(hereinafter “HVIRA”) passed by the State of California, which
mandated the disclosure of all policies sold in Europe between 1920 and
1945 by any insurance company (or any of its affiliates) doing business in
California.26
According to the Court, HVIRA unconstitutionally
interfered with the federal government’s foreign affairs power even
though the expression of the federal government’s interest came from a
sole executive agreement that did not explicitly preempt contrary state
action.27
Indeed, the various executive agreements with France,
Germany, and Austria implied that the agreements would not prevent
litigation in state courts.28 Nevertheless, the Court held that state law
must bow to federal foreign policy and that “generally” the Executive
has the authority to determine what foreign policy should be.29 In a
rhetorical flourish, the Court held that “[t]he basic fact is that California
seeks to use an iron fist where the President has consistently chosen kid
gloves” and such conflict required the state approach to give way.30
C. Other Options?
The remaining preemptive approaches—express preemption,
requiring an explicit statement from Congress to preempt the state law,
and conflict preemption, requiring preemption if the provisions of the
two laws directly conflict or if compliance with both is impossible—may
also be appropriate in certain circumstances. Crosby noted that express
statements of congressional intent were not required given the facts of
that case, but it left open the door to its use in the foreign affairs sphere.
Moreover, some foreign affairs statutes do contain express preemption
clauses, perhaps indicating congressional belief that it may be at times
Id. at 380–81.
Id. at 373 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
26
539 U.S. 396 (2003).
27
A “sole executive agreement” is an agreement between the United States and a foreign
nation(s) executed without the intended or actual participation of the Senate or House of
Representatives.
28
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 407–08. In the executive agreements, the United States agreed
to submit a statement in any litigation in U.S. courts that the maintenance of any suits
against French, Austrian, and German companies based on Holocaust-related activities
would interfere with the foreign policy interests of the United States. Id.
29
Id. at 413.
30
Id. at 428.
24
25
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necessary for Congress to explicitly preempt state interference (or, of
course, it may be simply an abundance of congressional caution).31 It
remains to be seen, however, where either of these preemption
paradigms would be appropriate.
III. TWO-DIMENSIONAL FEDERALISM
This Article presents a framework that courts can use to decide
which of the competing preemption paradigms should apply to a given
state action. Even after the putative demise of the “one voice”
conception of the federal/state balance,32 under which the Executive had
to be free to conduct foreign affairs and anything interfering with his or
her ability to speak as the nation’s “one voice” must fall, none seriously
contend that the states can speak for the United States in matters of
foreign policy. Thus, the question becomes: when does state action that
purports to merely legislate actually interfere with the federal
government’s interest in a uniform expression of foreign policy? And, in
the case of peripheral entanglements with the federal government’s
interest, how explicit must the federal government be to preempt the
offending state act? This essay seeks to answer those questions by
considering how the concepts of horizontal and vertical federalism apply
to foreign affairs preemption. Recent scholarship has explored the
difference between these two different types of federalism and
federalism’s effects.33 Vertical federalism refers to the balance of power
31
See, e.g., War and National Defense Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(c) (2006) (explaining the
term “preemption” to mean:
The provisions of this section and the regulations issued pursuant
thereto shall preempt any law, rule, or regulation of any of the several
States or the District of Columbia, or any of the territories or
possessions of the United States, or of any governmental subdivision
thereof, which law, rule, or regulation pertains to participation in,
compliance with, implementation of, or the furnishing of information
regarding restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by
foreign countries against other countries.)
32
Barclays Bank PLC. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994). In Barclays, the Court
conducted a close examination of a California tax policy that required “worldwide
combined reporting,” in contrast to the federal government’s “‘separate accounting’
method.” Id. at 307–10. After examining similar tax cases dealing with whether the federal
interest in uniformity justified preemption of the state tax, it held that Congressional
inaction (and the occasional refusal to act) on similar past matters indicated a willingness to
allow the tax and that its ability to speak in one voice had not been compromised. Id. at
324–30. “[P]recatory” Executive assertions of the interference with foreign relations were
immaterial because the Constitution gave Congress, and not the Executive, control over
foreign commerce. Id. at 330.
33
See Robert B. Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New Federalism: Lessons
from Coordination, 73 MO. L. REV. 1185 (2008); Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 3 [2010], Art. 5

870

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

between the states and the federal government; in the case of the United
States, the vertical federalism structure is imposed by the Supremacy
Clause.34 The foreign affairs area is often cited as the quintessential
example of and argument for vertical federalism.35 Vertical federalism
largely concerns itself with uniformity, and the foreign affairs field is no
exception in that regard. Preemption, in a vertical federalist analysis,
enforces the federal determination over specific experiments taken at the
state level because the field at issue has been entrusted to federal
safekeeping. As Professors Issacharoff and Sharkey recently noted:
When what is at stake is a national, integrated scheme
for employee benefits, labor law, carrier liability, or
arbitration, for example, the vertical dimension to the
federalism interest points to the central role of national
power in solving the autarchic impulses that doomed
the Articles of Confederation and prompted the creation
of the modern federal state.36
Horizontal federalism, on the other hand, addresses the allocation
and distribution of authority and power among the several states.37
Horizontal federalism concerns itself with coordination problems
between and among states, rather than uniformity concerns.38 The
poster child for horizontal federalism is environmental law, though
convincing arguments are made for many other commercial areas of the
law, such as product liability. Despite scholars’ branding foreign affairs
and, more specifically, foreign affairs preemption as vertical federalism
analyses, horizontal federalism concerns are also often present. In this
context, “[p]reemption is a way of arresting [the several states’] perennial
quest for a free lunch.”39 In other words:

L. REV. 493 (2008); Scott Fruehwald, The Rehnquist Court and Horizontal Federalism: An
Evaluation and a Proposal for Moderate Constitutional Constraints on Horizontal Federalism, 81
DENV. U. L. REV. 289 (2003); Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor
Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353 (2006); Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs:
Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal
Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31 (2007).
34
Erbsen, supra note 33, at 501.
35
Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 33, at 1370.
36
Id.
37
Erbsen, supra note 33, at 501; Ahdieh, supra note 33, at 1218.
38
Ahdieh, supra note 33, at 1187–88.
39
Michael S. Greve, Subprime, but not Half-Bad, AEI FEDERALIST OUTLOOK, Sept. 2003,
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.19271/pub_detail.asp.
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So long as the costs of regulation accrue principally
within each regulating state, states should generally be
free to do as they please. Overregulated citizens and
businesses tend to leave, and that threat will at some
point discipline the politicians setting the rules. In
contrast, when states impose the costs of their regulatory
experiments on citizens in other states, the folks who foot
the bill can neither run away nor vote the bums out of
office. For that reason, state politicians are extremely
creative in exporting the costs of their schemes.40
While the federal concern for uniformity in matters addressing relations
with foreign nations will (almost) always be present, such horizontal
concerns for coordination also frequently occur. Horizontal federalism
problems can take several forms relevant to foreign affairs.41 Of primary
concern are state acts in the foreign affairs realm that create negative
externalities for other states. The risk, for example, is that an Illinois law
sanctioning the Sudan could cause a citizen of New Jersey, to whom the
legislators of Illinois are neither responsible nor owe any allegiance, to
have goods seized or to experience other negative treatment by the
government of Sudan. Similarly, state laws that favored (or disfavored)
products from a given foreign state or, for example, required certain
human rights certifications, might ultimately raise costs for citizens of
other states, who would have little direct recourse.42 Finally, competition
among states for foreign investment could raise similar concerns if tax
breaks or other benefits would prejudice other sister-state interests.43
This essay argues that courts should evaluate the vertical and
horizontal federalism concerns that are implicated by the state law in
question. In so doing, courts can draw a better picture of the relative
interests of the state individually, any interested sister state, the
collective of states generally, and the federal government. Those
interests will determine the appropriate approach to adopt in
considering whether the state law is preempted.

Id.
Erbsen, supra note 33, at 512–28. Allan Erbsen’s thorough exegesis of various types of
horizontal federalism concerns outlines eight separate sources of interstate friction:
Dominion, Havens, Exclusions, Favoritism, Externalities, Rogues, Competition, and
Overreaching. Id.
42
See id. at 516–20. These would be examples of “havens” and/or “exclusions” under
Erbsen’s typology. Id.
43
See id. This is an example of Erbsen’s “competition” friction. Id.
40
41
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IV. FOREIGN AFFAIRS PREEMPTION ACROSS TWO DIMENSIONS
This essay proposes a framework for choosing an appropriate
preemption paradigm. This framework first separates state actions that
create foreign affairs problems into three categories. The following
sections set out the typology of the three categories and provide
examples of state actions that would fall into those categories. The
framework then assigns the appropriate preemption paradigm to each of
these categories, addressing the vertical and horizontal federalism
concerns of each category, as well as the realities of our political and
legal system.
A. The Tripartite Typology
Applying these concepts of horizontal and vertical federalism and
viewing the tensions created by the relevant state action reveals three
types of foreign affairs controversies. The first category includes those
cases that implicate neither vertical nor horizontal federalism concerns.
The second consists of state actions that implicate only vertical
federalism/uniformity concerns, and the third and final category
contains state actions that raise problems across both federalism
dimensions.44
1.

Tall and Skinny State Actions: Neither Vertically nor Horizontally
Challenged

State actions fall into this category where the state statute/action
causes only incidental effects on the conduct of foreign relations and
raises negligible or positive externality concerns. Statutes of general
application applied evenhandedly to a foreign party or interest will often
fall into this category. Other examples of the many state actions that
would fall into this category include: (1) sister-city arrangements
(agreements between a municipality in the United States with a
geographically- and culturally-diverse municipality in order to expand
on historical or cultural ties, and to create and develop commercial
relationships);45 (2) trade office and chamber of commerce

44
This essay leaves out the obvious fourth possibility where horizontal concerns are
implicated, without vertical/uniformity concerns, as food for other work—in the foreign
affairs preemption world, this option is not relevant.
45
See Sister Cities International, http://www.sistercities.org/index.cfm (last visited Oct.
20, 2009) (noting that these arrangements are increasingly common and are the result of a
program started by President Eisenhower in 1956).
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arrangements;46 and (3) study abroad and other academic exchanges
between states, state universities, and foreign parties.47
One increasingly common example is a bilateral arrangement
between a state government and a foreign sovereign to promote
investment in a certain industry between the two constituencies.
California has entered into several such agreements48 with Israel, with
the following stated purposes:
1. To seek enhanced trade relationships and facilitate
cooperation between companies[;] 2. To encourage
bilateral investment[;] 3. To support industrial research
and development between companies, particularly in
high technology[;] 4. To promote the exchange of ideas
between various businesses, trade associations, business
agencies and commercial institutions as well as visits of
company representatives, engineers, Scientists and other
specialists[; and] 5. To notify of trade fairs and
exhibitions, investment seminars and other business
related conferences.49
There have also been recent efforts in California to create a bilateral
agreement/memorandum of understanding in the technology sector.50
A final example is the municipal adoption of the substantive provisions
of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (hereinafter “CEDAW”).51 Despite
President Carter’s signature, CEDAW has languished for decades
See, e.g., ESD Locations, http://www.empire.state.ny.us/Contacts_and_about_us/
locations.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2010). New York has offices of the Empire State
Development Corporation in the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, China, Canada, Israel,
Mexico, and France and has offices with the Council of Great Lake Governors in Brazil,
Chile, and South Africa. Id. See also Enterprise Florida, International Advantages,
http://www.eflorida.com/ContentSubpage.aspx?id=348 (last visited Feb. 5, 2010). Florida
has fourteen international offices. Id.
47
See, e.g., University International Council, http://www.ohio.edu/uic/agreements.
cfm. For example, The Ohio State University has agreements with departments of the
governments of Swaziland and Malaysia, among others. Id.
48
These are generally termed Memoranda of Understanding or Intent, likely designed to
avoid creating a Constitutional problem under the Compact Clause.
49
California-Israel Cooperation Agreements, May 27, 1998, available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/calmous.html.
50
See Press Release, California State Assembly Member Bob Blumenfield, CaliforniaIsrael Cooperative Agreement on Renewable Energy Approved by Assembly Committee
(April 29, 2009), available at http://democrats.assembly.ca.gov/members/a40/News_
Room/Press/20090429AD40PR01.aspx.
51
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 20378.
46
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without Senate ratification. The City of San Francisco, however, adopted
substantive provisions of CEDAW as a matter of municipal law,
beginning with a self-study of public departments leading to
recommendations to the departments on how to best implement
CEDAW’s principles.52
2.

The Old Suit: Traditional Foreign Affairs Uniformity Issues

The second category is that of the classic foreign affairs preemption
case. In these situations, the state action creates non-trivial interference
with the uniform position of the United States (regardless of whether
that position has been expressed), but there is no concern about interstate coordination. One example of such a state action would be a Buy
American Statute.53 California’s Buy American Act, for example,
requires that contracts for public buildings or materials for public use be
given to persons or companies that agree to use materials manufactured
in the United States from materials produced in the United States.54
Missouri similarly limits the purchase of goods and services by public
agencies and subdivisions to those produced in the United States, subject
to certain exceptions.55 Many other states have similar restrictions on the
spending of public funds.56
These statutes, of course, raise uniformity concerns. The federal
government has an interest in uniform standards for the import of and
trade in foreign goods. However, there is no significant coordination
problem; rather, the interests of other states are unlikely to be
significantly and negatively affected, unless there was evidence that the
Buy American Statute at issue was intended to affect one specific foreign
state or was being applied in that manner. Indeed, generally speaking,
Buy American Statutes in one state would reduce demand for foreign
goods and services and render those goods cheaper in other states.
Thus, under normal circumstances, they would raise only uniformity
concerns.

Resnik, supra note 33, at 58; see S.F. COMM’N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, CEDAW
ACTION PLAN (2003), available at http://www.sfgov.org/site/cosw_page.asp?id=17146.
53
See Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 913 (3d Cir. 1990); K.S.B.
Technical Sales Corp. v. N.J. Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 381 A.2d 774, 782–84 (N.J. 1977);
N. Am. Salt Co. v. Ohio Dep’t of Transp., 701 N.E.2d 454, 462 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
54
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 4303 (West 2008).
55
MO. REV. STAT. § 34.353 (2001).
56
E.g., MINN. STAT. § 16.073 (2005); MO. REV. STAT. § 34.353 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 40A:11-18 (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:32-1, 52:33-2 (West 2001); N.Y. GEN. MUN.
LAW § 103 (McKinney Supp. 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 125.09(C) (West 2002); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 61, § 51 (2001).
52
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Short, Squat State Statutes: Those That Raise Both Horizontal and
Vertical Federalism Concerns

The final category of state actions are those that interfere with the
federal government’s interest in uniformity vis-à-vis the international
community and a sister-state’s (or several sister-states’) individualized
interests. Generally speaking, these are state statutes that single out a
foreign government or set of governments for specific negative treatment
or condemnation.57 Garamendi, Zschernig, and Crosby would all fit into
this category.58 Taking Crosby as an example, one can see how the
federalism interests would play out. The uniformity concerns are, as is
often the case, straightforward. The federal government has an interest
in a singular and integrated approach to Burma, its government, and its
human rights record.59 The Massachusetts law both affected the efficacy
of that effort and created the potential for interference with U.S. relations
with the international community more generally.60 The state law
interfered with the ability of the federal government to negotiate with
Burma and to work with the rest of the international community.61 It
also, however, creates potential negative externalities, which raise
horizontal federalism concerns. In passing additional sanctions against
Burma, Massachusetts created a risk of altering Burmese behavior
toward residents of any other state. For example, a traveler from another
state who happened to be in Burma (perhaps unwisely, given the
climate) would be potentially subject to reprisals as a result of the
Massachusetts action and would have had no input in, or recourse
against, the Massachusetts government that passed the sanctions bill.
Importantly, this possibility of reprisal would have been present
regardless of federal action.
B. The Advantages of the Tripartite Typology
Classifying state actions in this manner provides a helpful
framework for analyzing foreign affairs preemption cases for several
reasons. First, this typology, by exploring the federalism tensions
created by the state action, reflects the constitutional allocation of power
between the federal government and the states, and among the several
states as well. Any preemption analysis is, at its heart, a balancing act
See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 578 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2009).
See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
59
See Crosby, 530 U.S. 363.
60
Id. at 381–82.
61
Id. at 382.
57
58
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and the identification and separation of the distinct federal and state
interests and effects allows the court to achieve a more desirable and
stable equilibrium.
Second, the typology allows courts to more easily identify the
various interests of the players and separate out the parties who
represent those interests. Parsing out protectionism from concerns about
the United States’ policies on human rights violations in Sudan can help
a court in considering the level of interference with the federal
government’s uniformity interest. Moreover, isolating those ideas from
the interstate effect, regardless of whether intentional or incidental,
allows for easier measurement and evaluation.
Third, the typology and the separation of those interests reflect the
realities of our federal structure. Congress and the President excel at
identifying challenges to the federal government’s interest in unimpeded
power to communicate, negotiate, and otherwise undertake the foreign
relations business of the United States as a whole. They can be
depended on to remedy incursions into that sphere, challenges along the
vertical/uniformity axis, as they deem in the best interests of the United
States.
Conversely, inter-state coordination issues and externalities or
disequilibria among the states are less well protected by Congress.
Indeed, if several states act together in a certain manner to the detriment
of a single other state, it may be difficult or even impossible for that
aggrieved state to achieve the consensus necessary for congressional
action. The interests of that state, therefore, must be protected in another
manner. Finally, because this typology establishes default rules, it serves
to enhance the predictability and flexibility of the application of foreign
affairs preemption. It is predictable because a state seeking to enact a
law knows whether it may do so by itself, without regard to federal
action, or whether it must go to Congress first for permission. The
ability of Congress to allow states to invade its prerogatives provides the
flexibility. Just as the federal government can explicitly preempt certain
actions that states otherwise would be able to undertake, it can explicitly
allow others that it deems are worth the problems that they may create.
C. Applying the Preemption Paradigm
Preemption is, at its heart, an invasion into the sovereignty of the
states. As such, when choosing among the numerous options,62 the
62
There are other preemption paradigms not discussed in this Article. See generally
CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 89–125 (2004) (discussing preemption analysis).
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proper preemption paradigm affects that sovereignty only so far as
necessary to protect the offended and constitutionally superior (or at
least equal) interest. The less invasive a state action is into other
sovereigns’ spheres, be they sister-state or federal, the more deferential a
court should be to that state action. On the other hand, the farther
outside its borders and limits a state ventures, the more searching the
preemption analysis should be. Armed with the typology created above,
the preemption paradigms fall naturally into place along their
continuum of invasiveness, from explicit to dormant preemption,
thereby respecting as much as possible the balance between federal and
state interests.
For the first archetype, where the state statute presents neither
vertical nor horizontal concerns, it does not, by definition, challenge the
federal expression of foreign policy nor does it impinge on any other
state’s interests. Rather, the state acts, within its authority, as it sees fit to
maintain public order or serve the public good. Thus, under these
circumstances, it is appropriate to require either explicit or conflict
preemption of state law; that is, the state law is preempted only if the
federal statute (or treaty) contains explicitly preemptory language or
compliance with both the federal and state enactments would be
impossible.63 Direct conflict or explicit preemption is warranted in these
circumstances because the state’s interest is strongest in laws of general
application and the state does not directly implicate the federal interest
in uniformity or the other states’ interests in remaining free from
interference. If the peripheral interference with other states or the
federal government is sufficiently grave, the federal government will, no
doubt, be able to legislate and explicitly preempt the state statute at
issue, if the area is within its constitutional powers.64
In the second category, with vertical but no horizontal federalism
concerns present, obstacle preemption is the best approach.65 The federal
government and state governments have largely overlapping authority,
although these actions directly implicate foreign affairs, as they do not
threaten the interests of other states. In these situations, by definition,
the state action has created a non-trivial interference with the federal
government’s conduct of foreign relations; thus, any valid federal action,
by either the executive or legislative branch, should preempt state law.66
See supra Part II.C (defining express preemption).
Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (displacing contrary state law due to a
treaty regarding migratory birds even though Congress’s power to enact similar measures
in the absence of a treaty was questioned).
65
See supra Part II.B (discussing foreign affairs examples of obstacle preemption).
66
This Article does not decide the complicated question of what the appropriate balance
is between the Executive and Legislative branches in foreign affairs. There has been
63
64
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Nevertheless, as Congress and the President are well able to protect their
own power and interests, one can require some action, whether by
statute or executive order, on their part to establish the general policy of
the United States. If the state statute presents an obstacle to the fruition
of that policy, it must bow before it.
The final category of state statutes contains those that raise both
vertical and horizontal federalism concerns. This is the type of action
that states can be said to lack the constitutional power to effect. Not only
is their interest limited in the international sphere generally, but each
state holds that limited power equally. One state should not be allowed
to impinge upon another state’s authority in this manner.67 Thus,
dormant foreign affairs preemption is an appropriate way to block this
type of state action.
These are cases that single out, in a negative or derogatory manner, a
particular state or specific group of states. The federal government has a
clear interest in uniform relations with given states, just as it does with
the international community generally. It is certainly capable of
protecting that interest by itself, without resorting to dormant
preemption. However, where a state denigrates or seeks to punish a
distinct foreign nation, it exports the burden created to other states as
well. Nor is Congress the place to which those other offended states can
look for recourse; the nature of the republican system is that smaller
groups can often block the efforts of larger groups of states, to say
nothing of the case where it is one state that bears the brunt of a larger
minority.
It bears noting that there is nothing stopping Congress from
allowing state actions of the latter two types to persist. Indeed, recent
state incursions into the federal foreign affairs sphere regarding the
Sudan have led to just that.68 Various states passed Crosby-like statutes
condemning the atrocities committed in Darfur.69 A suit was brought to

extensive debate on this point, all well beyond the scope of this Article. See generally
MICHAEL GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 165–91 (1990) (discussing Presidential
policy and Executive Agreements); Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA
Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995); Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive
Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573 (2007); Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the
(Non)Treaty Power, 77 N. CAROLINA L. REV. 133 (1998).
67
See Erbsen, supra note 33.
68
See Resnik, supra note 33, at 80–81.
69
See Resnik, supra note 33, at 80–81; SUDAN DIVESTMENT TASK FORCE, THE STATE OF
SUDAN DIVESTMENT: AN OVERVIEW OF STATES, CITIES, UNIVERSITIES, COMPANIES, AND
PRIVATE
PENSIONS
CURRENTLY
WORKING
ON
SUDAN
DIVESTMENT,
http://www.sudandivestment.org/docs/state_of_sudan_divestment.pdf (presenting a
snapshot as of August 1, 2008).
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enjoin the enforcement of the Illinois statute70 and, on the basis of foreign
affairs preemption, the court granted the injunction.71 Within the year,
however, Congress passed the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act
of 2007 (hereinafter “SADA”), which allows states to enact prohibitions
on debt financing for companies doing business in the Sudan, essentially
authorizing the states to enact economic sanctions against the Sudan.72
Thus, the states were able to enact measures that were suspect under our
conceptions of vertical and horizontal federalism.73 This ability of
Congress to allow state interference combined with the use of dormant
preemption, and to a lesser extent obstacle preemption, results in an
effective switch of the default rules. Where neither federalism axis is
challenged, the default is that Congress must act explicitly to preempt
the state action; where both are implicated, the default is that Congress
must act explicitly to allow the state action. This default presumption
further supports the delicate balance that the framework developed
above imposes on foreign affairs preemption.

The Illinois Act to End Atrocities and Terrorism in the Sudan is codified at 15 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 520/22.5 (2008); 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/22.6 (2008) (repealed 2007); 40 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.6 (2008).
71
Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 751 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
72
SADA also eased certain sales restrictions on sales by private pension and mutual
funds to sell their investments, allowing their compliance with the state statutes as well as
allowing them to follow any moral compulsion they might feel. See Sudan Accountability
and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, 121 Stat. 2516 (2007) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 nt). It also required certifications from companies
seeking federal government contracts to certify their lack of involvement with the Sudan.
Id.
73
While President George W. Bush signed SADA, he did so issuing a signing statement
in which he stated:
This Act purports to authorize State and local governments to divest
from companies doing business in named sectors in Sudan and thus
risks being interpreted as insulating from Federal oversight State and
local divestment actions that could interfere with implementation of
national foreign policy. However, as the Constitution vests the
exclusive authority to conduct foreign relations with the Federal
Government, the executive branch shall construe and enforce this
legislation in a manner that does not conflict with that authority.
Statement on Signing the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, 43 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. (Dec. 31, 2007). In other words, the President was retaining the authority
to unilaterally strike down specific state statutes if he felt they unduly interfered with the
conduct of foreign affairs. The constitutionality of signing statements is extremely unclear
as is the principle that the President could undertake this type of unilateral veto of a state
statute.
70
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V. CONCLUSION
Foreign affairs preemption and the Supreme Court’s application and
justification thereof have been rightly questioned as lacking any sort of
rigor or method. The twin lenses of two-dimensional federalism provide
a framework that allows the tailoring of the preemption doctrines to the
specific state action at issue. Under the framework developed above,
states know what to expect when passing statutes with the potential to
impinge upon the foreign affairs powers of the federal government and
the federal government is aware of when it needs to act to prevent such
interference and when action by Congress is unnecessary.
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